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Abstract
This paper studies obfuscation decisions by firms. We show that more
prominent firms are more likely to obfuscate. While prominent firms
always choose maximum obfuscation, the obfuscation by less promi-
nent firms depends on the degree of asymmetry in prominence and
consumer protection policy. We evaluate the impact of a consumer
protection policy that limits the scope of obfuscation. We show that
such a policymay not be effective as less prominent firmsmay increase
their obfuscation practice.
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1 Introduction
Consumer decision making is often imperfect. Consumers are susceptible
to behavioral biases and suffer from cognitive limitations when evaluating
competing offers. This has been documented for many markets, includ-
ing for example, telecommunication markets (Miravete (2013)), electricity
markets (Waddams and Wilson (2010)) and online auctions (Hossain and
Morgan (2006)). It is then hardly surprising that firms try to exploit these
biases and cognitive limitations by obfuscation strategies (Ellison and Elli-
son (2009)).
Retail financial markets are a prime example. Here, imperfect consumer
decisions are well documented (e.g., Campbell (2006); Calvet et al. (2009);
Stango and Zinman (2009, 2011)) and there is robust evidence for strategies
designed to take advantage of consumers’ limited understanding. For in-
stance, financial institutions might shroud certain elements of their pricing
strategies (Gabaix and Laibson (2006); Campbell (2006)) or highlight irrele-
vant information (Choi et al. (2010)).1 Firms take advantage of consumers’
different information levels regarding price and product attributes leading
to price dispersion for almost identical products (Christoffersen and Musto
(2002); Hortacsu and Syverson (2004)). Even worse, firms develop redun-
dant ‘financial innovations’ exclusively designed to attract naive consumers
(Henderson and Pearson (2011)).
In this paper, we studywhether policies to promotemarket transparency
and to protect consumers are effective given that firmsmay choose to obfus-
cate. We focus on the impact of such policies in asymmetric settings: Firms,
competing for retail customers, differ with respect to their level of promi-
nence. The advantage of prominent firms is that they can attract a larger
share of naive consumers who have difficulties comparing firms’ offers.2 In
1Relying on outside advice may not help in making good decisions as this advice may
be biased due to agency problems between financial institutions, their sales agents and con-
sumers (Bolton et al. (2007); Inderst and Ottaviani (2009, 2012); Woodward and Hall (2012)).
2In practice, different levels of prominence may arise for several reasons. For instance,
an established incumbentmay be viewed by consumers asmore prominent and trustworthy
than a newcomer firm. State-owned firmsmay enjoy greater levels of trust than their private
competitors. Alternatively, prominencemay arise due to higher marketing efforts or a better
reputation of a firm. Similar in spirit, Armstrong et al. (2009b) and Rhodes (2011) consider
a sequential search model where consumers search prominent firms first. Armstrong and
Zhou (2011) investigate how firms can become prominent. Zhou (2011) analyzes the incen-
tives of firms to become prominent in a model where consumers are reference-dependent.
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this setting, firms choose how much to obfuscate the market. We interpret
obfuscation rather broadly and define it as to comprise all strategic actions
that prevent some consumers to recognize the best offer. In this context,
we are interested in the following questions. Which firms have more incen-
tives to obfuscate, prominent firms or less prominent ones? What factors
determine firms’ obfuscation strategies? And most importantly, what are
the effects of policies that aim at protecting consumers from obfuscation?
We analyze a two-stage game where two firms offer a homogeneous
product and sell it to consumers. There are two types of consumers: so-
phisticated and naive consumers. Sophisticated consumers can perfectly
evaluate the firms’ offers and pick the better one. In contrast, naive con-
sumers are not able to compare the two offers, and thus randomly choose
one of the offers. However, consumers are biased towards one firm; naive
consumers choose to buy from themore prominent firmwith a larger prob-
ability. In this setting, firms have two decisions to make. In the first stage,
firms simultaneously choose how much to obfuscate. By obfuscating more
a firm can increase the number of naive consumers in the market, and the
number of sophisticated consumers is accordingly decreased. In the second
stage, firms—knowing howmany naive and sophisticated consumers are in
the market—compete in prices.
We demonstrate that the more prominent firm has, in general, larger in-
centives to obfuscate. In fact, we find that this firm always chooses maximal
obfuscation. There are two reasons for this: First, by choosing obfuscation
there aremore naive consumers and those consumers are particularly likely
to buy from the prominent firm. Due to this obfuscation the prominent firm
can secure itself a large share of consumers. Second, more obfuscated mar-
kets are less competitive and, in consequence, prices and profits are higher.
Both effects point to large incentives for prominent firms to engage in ob-
fuscation. In contrast, for the less prominent firm the two effects may point
in opposite directions and consequently this firm has less incentive to en-
gage in obfuscation. On the negative side, this firm gives up consumers if it
chooses to obfuscate as those now naive consumers are likely to buy from
the competitor. This negative effect is more pronounced if the asymmetry
in prominence is large. On the positive side, however, the less prominent
firm benefits from weaker competition if the number of naive consumers is
large. When determining its optimal level of obfuscation, the less promi-
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nent firm has to balance these two effects, and, under certain parameters
the less prominent firm chooses an interior level of obfuscation. As a result,
we show that obfuscation incentives by the less prominent firm is larger if
the asymmetry in prominence is small as in this case the first effect is rather
small.3
The key part of our analysis concerns the effects of a consumer protec-
tion policy aimed at increasingmarket transparency. We consider the intro-
duction of consumer protection policies on the consumer side as well as on
the firm side. On the consumer side, this could be, for instance, an educa-
tional programme to increase financial literacy. Consumers are less likely
to be confounded by complex price structures if financial literacy is high.
A firms-side intervention could be a disclosure policy that forces firms to
disclose all possible fees or a cap on obfuscation possibilities such as lim-
iting the length of the ‘footer’ section of a credit card contract. Is such a
consumer protection policy effective? Interestingly, our answer is that such
a policy can be much less effective than expected. Indeed, under some cir-
cumstances such a policy is not effective at all. Introducing this policy has
the intended effect on the prominent firm causing this firm to obfuscate less.
However, the introduction of the policy has a second, unintended effect on
the obfuscation decisions by the less prominent firm. In fact, we show that
the less prominent firm has an incentive to increase obfuscation in response
to such a policy. The reason for this effect is that due to the reduced obfus-
cation by the prominent firm themarket has becomemore competitive than
preferred by the non-prominent firm. In consequence, this firm increases
its obfuscation efforts. In particular, any marginal reduction in the scope
for obfuscation is completely offset by increased obfuscation from the non-
prominent firm provided that the non-prominent firm chooses an interior
level of obfuscation.
Our paper is related to the growing literature on behavioral industrial
organization which studies the impact of competition in the presence of be-
haviorally biased or inattentive consumers.4 Most closely to our paper, Car-
lin (2009) studies how firms can exploit consumers’ limited sophistication
by obfuscation. This paper studies a symmetric oligopoly where firms—as
3Indeed, if firms enjoy identical levels of prominence both firms choose maximum ob-
fuscation.
4See Huck and Zhou (2011) for a survey and Spiegler (2011) for a textbook.
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in our paper—can increase the share of naive consumers. Most importantly,
he shows that more competition in the form of more firms leads to more
obfuscation.5 We share the focus on obfuscation strategies; however, we
consider an asymmetric setting caused by firm heterogeneity and show that
asymmetrymatters for the effectiveness of regulation. Policies that limit ob-
fuscation are effective in symmetric markets but can be ineffective in asym-
metric settings.
Piccione and Spiegler (2012) provide a framework of obfuscation where
firms can choose different price frames, that when combined will result in
different levels of comparability for consumers. In an earlier version, Pic-
cione and Spiegler (2009), the authors also consider prominence by studying
a version of their model where consumers who are unable to compare of-
fers buy from the prominent firm (the incumbent, in their terminology). In
equilibrium, the prominent firm minimizes comparability while the non-
prominent firm (the entrant) does the opposite.6 In contrast, we provide
a model where the degree of prominence can be varied continuously. We
also depart from this paper by studying the impact of consumer protec-
tion policies in such an asymmetric industry. Chioveanu and Zhou (2012)
also provide an analysis where firms can obfuscate and earn positive prof-
its in homogeneous goods markets if consumers are confused by different
price frames. Spiegler (2013) provides a general duopoly framework that
captures a variety of obfuscation strategies (shrouding product attributes,
multi-dimensional pricing or framing in order to reduce product compara-
bility).
Obfuscation may also arise if consumers are unable to evaluate all char-
acteristics or price elements of a product. Spiegler (2006) considers a setup
where consumers are confused by a multitude of price dimensions. As-
suming a random sampling procedure by consumers, the paper shows that
firms adopt a random pricing strategy with high prices in some dimensions
and low prices along other dimensions. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) develop
a model where consumers observe one price component (price of the base
good), but are not aware of another component (the add-on). This leads
5Carlin and Manso (2011) analyze, in a theoretical model, the timing of obfuscation.
They show that small-scale education initiatives, leading to improved learning by naive con-
sumers, may be offset by firms choosing to obfuscate more frequently, resulting in welfare
losses and no improvement in market outcomes.
6This is also discussed in Spiegler (2011, Ch. 10.4).
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to an equilibrium with low base-good and high add-on prices. Alterna-
tively, obfuscation may also arise by firms manipulating search costs. Wil-
son (2010) and Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) analyze search models where
firms can obfuscate by increasing consumers’ search costs.
In the context of search markets, Armstrong et al. (2009a) and Arm-
strong (2012) argue that certain consumer protection policies such as limit-
ingmaximumprices can backfire and leadfirms to raise their average prices.
The intuition is that when prices are less dispersed under a price cap, fewer
consumers will make the effort to become better informed, and hence firms
face less competition. The present paper also argues that consumer protec-
tion policies can be ineffective. The mechanism is, however, different and
we focus on obfuscation practices in asymmetric markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
present our framework and theoretically analyze obfuscationdecisions. Sec-
tion III considers several extensions and modifications of our base model.
Finally, Section IV concludes.
2 A model of strategic obfuscation
2.1 Model Setup
Consider amarketwhere twofirms compete to supply a homogeneous prod-
uct. There is a mass one of consumers each demanding at most one unit of
the product if the reservation price of r > 0 is not exceeded. Consumers
are either sophisticated or naive. Sophisticated consumers understand true
offering prices and buy from the firm that offers the lowest price. A tie is
broken with an equal probability. Naive consumers, on the other hand, are
unable to compare prices and buy at randomwith a distribution to be spec-
ified below.
Shares of respective consumers are influenced byfirms’ obfuscation choices
and the consumer protection policy. More complex pricing and a lower level
of consumer protection lead to more naive consumers and accordingly, to
fewer sophisticated consumers. Let x ∈ (0, 1) be the level of the consumer
protection policy and ki ∈ [k, k¯] ⊂ R+, i = 1, 2, the firms’ obfuscation
choices.7 k can be interpreted as no obfuscation at all and k¯ as full obfusca-
7An increase in the obfuscation parameter ki might, for instance, correspond to the use
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tion. The proportion of naive consumers, µ ∈ (0, 1), is given by
(1) µ(x, k1, k2) = (1− x)θ(k1, k2),
where θ : [k, k¯]2 → (0, 1) measures the effectiveness of firms’ obfuscation
practice in confusing consumers with ∂θ
∂ki
> 0 for i = 1, 2. The proportion
of sophisticated consumers is thus 1− (1− x)θ(k1, k2).8
A larger x corresponds to a more stringent consumer protection pol-
icy and as a result there are fewer consumers susceptible to firms’ obfus-
cation practice. To the extreme of a completely effective consumers pro-
tection policy (x → 1), firm obfuscation becomes irrelevant and standard
Bertrand competition with only sophisticated buyers arises. For a given
non-trivial level of consumer protection policy, the more a firm obfuscates,
the more naive consumers there are as comparing prices becomes more dif-
ficult. Since price comparison requires an understanding of both offers, ob-
fuscation by either firm strictly increases the share of naive consumers.
Equation (1) represents those consumer protection policies that act di-
rectly on consumers.9 One example is education programmes aiming at
raising financial literacy of consumers. With amore financially literate pub-
lic, more consumers are capable of understanding complicatedpricing terms
and become immune to firm obfuscation.
When unable to compare prices, consumers often resort to factors like
past experiences, firm reputation, name recognition, etc. Not all firms are
identical in these respects. In this paper we introduce asymmetry in promi-
nence between the two firms to reflect this observation. Namely, Firm 1 is
more prominent than Firm 2 and captures a larger share, φ ∈ (12 , 1), of naive
consumers. Firm 2 receives the rest of those naive consumers 1− φ.10
of different terms and language—as can be observed in financial markets—which makes it
harder for some consumers to fully understand pricing and, hence, impedes comparisons
between different offers. Alternatively, an increase in obfuscation might also correspond to
the number of price elements (as in mobile phone contracts) which may also make it harder
for consumers to evaluate different offers and pick the best deal.
8We note that the results of the paper are robust to a slightly more general definition of
naive consumers µ = θ(x, k1, k2) with
∂θ
∂x
< 0 and ∂θ
∂ki
> 0. However, the exposition is
clearer using the multiplicative structure imposed in equation (1). Therefore, we present all
results in term of (1), but emphasize that the intuitions regarding the results do not rely on
this specific formulation.
9In Section III.(i), we discuss consumer protection policies that act directly on firms.
10Note that we assume that naive consumers do not understand that, as it will later turn
out, in equilibriumFirm 1will charge a higher price than Firm 2 on average. This seems to be
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We assume that both firms produce the product at constant marginal
costs which, for simplicity, are normalized to zero. To focus on strategic
effects among firms, the obfuscation choice is costless.11
The level of consumer protection is known to both firms at the beginning
of this two-player game. In stage 1, the two firms simultaneously and inde-
pendently decide on its own choice of obfuscation ki. After knowing each
other’s obfuscation level, i.e., the share of naive consumers, they compete
in prices in the second stage.12 Both firms are standard profit maximizers.
2.2 Equilibrium Prices
We start our analysis by writing out firm profits at the end of the game
as functions of the share of naive consumers and the two prices. Suppose
the share of naive consumers at the second stage is µ. These consumers
split between the two firms at a ratio of φ : (1 − φ) irrespective of prices.
Sophisticated consumers, however, are drawn to the lower priced firm. Firm
profits are hence
(2) Π1(µ, p1, p2) =


p1 [φµ+ (1− µ)] if p1 < p2
p1
[
φµ+ 1−µ2
]
if p1 = p2
p1φµ if p1 > p2
consistent with our notion of naiveness. Consumers who fail to recognize the best offer are
also unlikely to consider that one firm might have a larger incentives for higher prices than
another firm. Relatedly, we also assume that φ is independent from price choices. That is,
naive consumers are not able to compare different offers even if chosen prices are far apart.
11In Section III.(ii) we consider the case where obfuscation is costly for firms.
12Note that in contrast to Carlin (2009) obfuscation and pricing decisions are sequential
rather than simultaneous. That is, with sequential decisions, we assume pricing ismore flex-
ible while obfuscation tends to be more persistent. With simultaneous decisions, one would
assume that price and obfuscation are joint decisions. Which assumption is more appropri-
ate depends largely on the context. Assuming simultaneous move game would, however,
lead to qualitatively similar structure of equilibrium obfuscation as under sequential moves.
The prominent firm has larger incentives to obfuscate and would choose to obfuscate more
often than the non-prominent firm. The reason is that the prominent firm charges on average
a higher price than the less prominent firm and, hence, is more likely to benefit from obfus-
cation and a large number of naive consumers. Besides Carlin (2009), we refer the reader to
Piccione and Spiegler (2012) where pricing and obfuscation decisions (in that case, framing
of prices) are jointly determined.
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and
(3) Π2(µ, p1, p2) =


p2(1− φ)µ if p1 < p2
p2
[
(1− φ)µ+ 1−µ2
]
if p2 = p1
p2 [(1− φ)µ+ (1− µ)] if p1 > p2.
This second stage of the game is similar to Narasimhan (1988) although
with a different interpretation: our naive consumers are known as loyal con-
sumers in his paper.13 Narasimhan (1988) shows that there exists no pure
strategy pricing equilibrium. The unique equilibrium is in mixed strategies
with Firm 1 having a mass point at r equal to (2φ−1)µ
φµ+(1−µ) .
Lemma 1 (Narasimhan (1988)). For any given share of naive consumers, µ ∈
(0, 1), there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the pricing stage, in which
Firm 1 prices according to the cumulative distribution function
(4) F1(p) =


0 if p < p0
1 + (1−φ)µ1−µ − φµ(1−φµ)[φµ+(1−µ)](1−µ) rp if p0 ≤ p < r
1 if p ≥ r,
and Firm 2 prices according to the cumulative distribution function
(5) F2(p) =


0 if p < p0
1 + φµ1−µ − φµ1−µ rp if p0 ≤ p < r
1 if p ≥ r,
where
(6) p0 :=
φµr
φµ+ (1− µ)
is the lower bound of both firms’ prices.
It can be shown that the more prominent Firm 1’s price p1 first order
stochastically dominates p2 (Narasimhan (1988)). Therefore, the less promi-
13The mass of naive consumers captured by Firm 1, φµ, corresponds to Firm 1’s loyal con-
sumersα1 inNarasimhan (1988). Likewise, (1−φ)µ corresponds to Firm 2’s loyal consumers
α2, and (1− µ) to the remaining ‘switching’ consumers β.
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nent Firm 2 on average charges a lower price. The reason is that the oppor-
tunity cost of competing for sophisticated consumers is higher for the more
prominent firm as it loses more revenue than the other firm for each unit
of price reduction due to its larger share of naive consumers. As a result of
a lower price, sophisticated consumers are more likely to buy from the less
prominent firm.
A rise in the share of naive consumers tends to soften price competition
as there are less sophisticated consumers to compete for. That is, expected
prices charged by both firms increase in µ. This is shown formally in Ap-
pendix A(i).
2.3 Firm Profits and Consumer Welfare
Wenote that only Firm 1’s equilibrium strategy has amass point at the reser-
vation price r. By the fact that this is a mixed strategy equilibrium, Firm 1
expects to make the same profit as it would by selling only to its own share
of naive consumers at the reservation price:
(7) E(Π1) = φµr.
Firm 2’s expected profit can be found by inspecting the profit associated
with p2 → r. In this case, Firm 2 expects to receive its own share of naive
consumers as well as sophisticated consumers with a positive probability
due to the mass point of Firm 1 at p = r.14
(8) E(Π2) =


(2φ− 1)µ
φµ+ (1− µ)(1− µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected sales to sophisticated consumers
+ (1− φ)µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
sales to naive consumers

 r,
which simplifies to
(9) E(Π2) =
(1− φµ)φµr
φµ+ (1− µ) .
Although the more prominent firm makes a profit equal to the level it
14Alternatively, one can find Firm 2’s expected profits by letting its price be p0 in which
case it sells to its share of naive consumers and all sophisticated consumers.
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could always make by focusing only on its own share of naive consumers,
the less prominent firm’s profit is higher than it wouldmake by selling only
to naive consumers as E(Π2) > (1 − φ)µr. This is due to the mass point of
Firm 1 at p = r which means that Firm 2 sells to sophisticated consumers
with a positive probability even if it charges a price close to r (see Eq. (8)).
In this sense, the less prominent firm benefits from the presence of sophis-
ticated consumers.
An increase in the share of naive consumers has three effects on a firm’s
profit. First, with more naive consumers market competition is lower and
equilibrium price will be higher in the sense of first order stochastic dom-
inance. Second, demand from sophisticated consumers declines.15 Third,
demand from naive consumers rises. The first and third effect are positive
while the second is negative. For the prominent firm, the overall effect is
strictly positive as it does not have an advantage in competing for sophisti-
cated consumers in the first place. For the less prominent firm, the overall
effect is unclear. Therefore, its obfuscation incentive can be different from
its more prominent competitor.
As we consider a market for a homogeneous product, to determine con-
sumer surplus, we only need to know total payments from consumers to
firms.16 These payments correspond to total industry profits equal to
(10) E(Π1) + E(Π2) =
φµr(2− µ)
φµ+ (1− µ) .
Consumer surplus is then expressed as E(CS) = r − [E(Π1) + E(Π2)].
Hence, consumer surplus and industry profits are inversely related. Eval-
uating the impact of asymmetry and the share of naive consumers on con-
sumer surplus yields:
Lemma 2. Consumer surplus decreases with µ and φ.
15However, it should be noted that the profit from selling to sophisticated consumers can
also increase with µ. This can be seen when considering Firm 2 profit at p2 → r as is shown
in Eq. (8). Any increase in µ raises the profit from sophisticated consumers whenever µ <
1
2
. To see this consider that the sign of the derivative of sales to sophisticated consumers
depends on the sign of 1− 2µ+µ2(1−φ)which, for φ ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
, is guaranteed to be positive
for any µ < 1
2
.
16Note that total welfare is constant due to the assumption of inelastic demand. Prices are
mere transfers between consumers and firms.
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A rise in the share of naive consumers tends to soften competition in the
sense that industry profits rise and consumer surplus falls, that is
(11)
∂E(CS)
∂µ
= −φr[2(1− µ) + µ
2(1− φ)]
[φµ+ (1− µ)]2 < 0.
Hence, to analyze whether policies are effective in increasing consumer
surplus it is sufficient to analyze the impact on the share of naive consumers.
A consumer protection policy is effective whenever the share of naive con-
sumers is reduced.
Similarly, one can show thatmore asymmetricmarkets are also less com-
petitive since with a larger share of naive consumers, the more prominent
firm has higher opportunity costs in engaging in price competition if the
asymmetry increases. As a result, consumer surplus decreases with φ. This
is formally shown by
(12)
∂E(CS)
∂φ
= −µr(2− µ)(1− µ)
[φµ+ (1− µ)]2 < 0.
2.4 Equilibrium Obfuscation
We are now in the position to analyze the firms’ choices of obfuscation in
the first stage. Since Firm 1’s expected profit always increases in the share of
naive consumers and increasing obfuscation raises the share of naive con-
sumers, that is,
(13)
∂E(Π1)
∂k1
= φr(1− x) ∂θ
∂k1
> 0,
Firm1wants to obfuscate asmuch as possible. Hence, its equilibrium choice
of obfuscation is the highest k1, k¯.
The impact of obfuscation on Firm 2’s expected profit is more compli-
cated:
(14)
∂E(Π2)
∂k2
= [φ(1− φ)µ2 − 2φµ+ 1] φr
[φµ+ (1− µ)]2 (1− x)
∂θ
∂k2
.
Depending on asymmetry φ and the share of naive consumers µ, Firm
2 could find that an increase in its own obfuscation level increases or de-
creases its expected profit. As explained before, an increase in the share of
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naive consumers has three effects on Firm 2’s expected profit. Firm 2weighs
an increased demand from naive consumers and a softened price competi-
tion against the associated decrease in the demand from sophisticated con-
sumers when deciding on more obfuscation. For Firm 1, the positive effects
ofmore obfuscation always dominate the negative effects because of a larger
portion of naive consumers.
Let µ
x
and µx be respectively defined as
µ
x
= (1− x)θ(k¯, k) and µx = (1− x)θ(k¯, k¯).
For a given level of consumer protection x and with Firm 1 choosing k¯, the
share of naive consumers ranges from µ
x
to µxwhen Firm 2 obfuscates from
the levels of k to k¯. In other words, [µ
x
, µx] is the set of consumer composi-
tion Firm 2 can achieve by choosing corresponding obfuscation levels given
the policy environment x and Firm 1’s optimal strategy k¯. Also note that
[µ
x
, µx] is non-empty since
∂θ
∂k2
> 0.
The following proposition states equilibrium obfuscation.
Proposition 1. For a given combination of consumer protection policy x and
asymmetry in prominence φ, equilibrium obfuscation is as follows.
1. The more prominent Firm 1 chooses k∗1 = k¯.
2. Define µ˜(φ) :=
φ−
√
φ(2φ−1)
φ(1−φ) .
(a) If µ˜(φ) ≥ µx, the less prominent Firm 2 chooses k∗2 = k¯;
(b) If µ
x
< µ˜(φ) < µx, Firm 2 chooses the unique k
∗
2 such that µ
∗ :=
(1− x)θ(k¯, k∗2) = µ˜(φ);
(c) If µ˜(φ) ≤ µ
x
, Firm 2 chooses k∗2 = k.
Proof: see Appendix A(ii).
The intuition behind this result is the following. If it were completely
up to Firm 2, it would make the share of naive consumers be µ˜(φ) at which
the positive and negative effects of a marginal change in µ on Firm 2’s ex-
pected profit balance out. However, the share of naive consumers is also
influenced by consumer protection policy and Firm 1’s choice of obfusca-
tion. The range of µ Firm 2 can choose from is hence only [µ
x
, µx]. When
13
the ideal µ˜(φ) is above µx, Firm 2 obfuscates fully to make µ as close to µ˜(φ)
as possible. When µ˜(φ) is below µ
x
, even though Firm 2 would like to see
an even larger share of sophisticated consumers, no obfuscation is the best
it can do. Within the interval, µ˜(φ) is attainable and Firm 2 obfuscates ac-
cordingly.
With equilibrium obfuscation, we can derive the equilibrium share of
naive consumers for a given combination of x and φ.
Proposition 2. The share of naive consumers in equilibrium is
(15) µ∗ =


µx if µ˜(φ) ≥ µx
µ˜(φ) if µ
x
< µ˜(φ) < µx
µ
x
if µ˜(φ) ≤ µ
x
.
2.5 Discussion
We note that µ˜(φ) as a function of φ ∈ (12 , 1) strictly decreases in φ because
dµ˜(φ)
dφ
= −
(1− φ)2 +
(
φ−√φ(2φ− 1))2
2(1− φ)2φ√φ(2φ− 1) < 0.(16)
Since limφ→1 µ˜(φ) = 12 , µ˜(φ) ranges from 2 down to
1
2 as φ goes from
1
2 up to
1. Note also that as µ˜(φ) strictly decreases in φ, the inverse µ˜−1(µ) : (12 , 2)→
(12 , 1) exists.
Based on the value of µ˜(φ), further insights can be derived. First, for
φ ≤
√
5−1
2 ≈ 0.62, µ˜(φ) ≥ 1. In this region, as µx < 1, µ˜(φ) > µx and Firm 2
obfuscates fully by Proposition 1.
Remark 1. If φ ∈
(
1
2 ,
√
5−1
2
]
, k∗2 = k¯ and µ
∗ = µx.
This result underpins the importance of asymmetry in studying firms’
obfuscation incentives. If the two firms are sufficiently close in terms of
prominence, both firms will fully obfuscate.
Second, for φ >
√
5−1
2 , the level of consumer protection policy x plays an
important role in determining Firm 2’s equilibrium obfuscation. For exam-
ple, for a strong protection policy such that the share of consumers who are
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susceptible to obfuscation is below 12 , µ˜(φ) > µx and by Proposition 1, Firm
2 obfuscates fully irrespective of φ. When µx >
1
2 , under certain φ, µ˜(φ) is
attainable and Case (2b) in Proposition 1 results.
Remark 2. 1. If µx ≤ 12 , Firm 2 obfuscates fully irrespective of φ and the
equilibrium share of naive consumers is µx for all φ ∈ (12 , 1).
2. If µ
x
≤ 12 < µx, Firm 2 obfuscates fully and the equilibrium share of
naive consumers is µx for φ ∈ (12 , µ˜−1(µx)). For φ ∈ [µ˜−1(µx), 1), Case
(2b) in Proposition 1 results.
3. If µ
x
> 12 , Firm 2 obfuscates fully and equilibrium share of naive con-
sumers is µx for φ ∈ (12 , µ˜−1(µx)). For φ ∈ [µ˜−1(µx), µ˜−1(µx)], Case
(2b) in Proposition 1 results. Firm 2 does not obfuscate and the equi-
librium share of naive consumers is µ
x
for φ ∈ (µ˜−1(µ
x
), 1).
[Place Figure 1 approximately here.]
Figure 1 plots a situation covered by Part 3 of Remark 2 in which con-
sumer protection policy x and the obfuscation effectiveness θ lead to µ
x
=
0.6 and µx = 0.9. Although Firm 1 always obfuscates as much as possi-
ble, the obfuscation choice of Firm 2 stays at k¯ for φ ∈ (0.5, 0.66], gradually
decreases in φ to keep µ∗ at µ˜(φ) for φ ∈ (0.66, 0.87), and stays at k for
φ ∈ [0.87, 1).17
2.6 Comparative Static Predictions
There are two key parameters in the model, the degree of asymmetry in
prominence, as measured by the parameter φ and the level of consumer
protection policy, x. This section provides the comparative static predic-
tion on how equilibrium obfuscation is affected by these two parameters.
Regarding these predictions we will focus on Firm 2’s obfuscation choice
as Firm 1 always chooses maximal obfuscation independent of the level of
asymmetry and the consumer protection policy (Prop. 1).
In the example of Figure 1, we see Firm 2’s equilibrium obfuscation
choice and the equilibrium share of naive consumers decrease in asymme-
try in certain interval of φ. This in fact holds more generally.
17By equating µ˜(φ) to µ
x
= 0.9 and to µ
x
= 0.6 we find 0.66 and 0.87, respectively.
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Proposition 3. The less prominent Firm 2’s equilibrium obfuscation choice
and the equilibrium share of naive consumers weakly decrease in asymme-
try:
1. If µ˜(φ) > µx or µ˜(φ) < µx, a marginal change in φ does not change k
∗
2
and µ∗;
2. If µ
x
< µ˜(φ) < µx, k
∗
2 and µ
∗ strictly decrease in φ.
Proof: see Appendix A(iii).
Indeed, that Firm 2’s obfuscation and the share of naive consumers in
equilibrium weakly decrease also applies to a discrete upward jump in φ.
To avoid discussing too many cases, we present this result in terms of a
marginal change in φ. When µ˜(φ) is attainable, an increase in asymmetry
strictly reduces obfuscation and consequently the share of naive consumers.
In a more asymmetric market, the less prominent Firm 2 receives less naive
consumers and therefore, it prefers a lower share of naive consumers in
the market also to enjoy its advantage in competing for sophisticated con-
sumers. As a result, Firm 2 obfuscates less in a more asymmetric market.
A related question that arises is whether symmetric markets are more
or less competitive than asymmetric markets. While asymmetric markets
are less competitive for a given share of naive consumers (see Lemma 2),
we identify an opposing effect if the number of naive consumers is endoge-
nously determined via obfuscation. Asymmetry generally leads to less ob-
fuscation and a lower number of naive consumers, which is a pro-competitive
effect. The overall effect of asymmetry is hence ambiguous and depends on
the strength of those two effects.
Consumer protection policy reduces the proportion of consumers who
are susceptible to obfuscation. Clearly, a larger x shifts the interval [µ
x
, µx]
downwards. If Firm 2 obfuscates fully before and after a strengthening of
consumer protection policy, the policy is effective and the share of naive
consumers decreases. The sameholds true if Firm 2 chooses not to obfuscate
in both cases. Interestingly, a stricter policymaynot be effective. If for a level
of asymmetry φ such that
µ˜(φ) ∈ [µ
x′ , µx′ ] ∩ [µx′′ , µx′′ ] 6= ∅
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where x′′ > x′, µ˜(φ) is attainable before and after the policy change. From
Proposition 2, we see that the equilibrium share of naive consumers is un-
affected by the policy change. The effect of a larger x is neutralized by an
increase in obfuscation by Firm 2. Therefore, an introduction of a consumer
protection policy can be ineffective in raising the share of sophisticated con-
sumers in a market. Intuitively, for given obfuscation choices a stricter pol-
icy reduces the share of naive consumers. If this share falls short of the
desired share of naive consumers Firm 2 reacts by increasing obfuscation.
Firm 1does not react to the policy change as obfuscation is alreadymaximal.
Proposition 4. Suppose consumer protection policy strictly increases from x′
to x′′.
1. If µx′′ ≥ µx′ and µx′′ > 12 , then there exists a φ such that µ˜(φ) ∈
[µ
x′ , µx′′ ]. Moreover, for all such φ, the equilibrium share of naive con-
sumers is not affected and Firm 2 obfuscates more.
2. The equilibrium share of naive consumers is reduced in the following
three cases.
(a) µx′′ < µx′ ;
(b) µx′′ ≥ µx′ but µx′′ ≤ 12 ;
(c) µx′′ ≥ µx′ and µx′′ > 12 , but µ˜(φ) /∈ [µx′ , µx′′ ].
Proof: see Appendix A(iv).
Proposition 4 shows that if the consumer protection policy does not be-
come sufficiently effective, i.e. µx′′ ≥ µx′ and µx′′ > 12 , then there exist cases
in which Firm 2’s preferred level of naive consumers is attainable both be-
fore and after the policy change, and hence in theses cases the equilibrium
share of naive consumers remains unchanged despite of the policy change.
Proposition 4 also shows that in all other cases, the policy change is effective
in reducing equilibrium share of naive consumers.
[Place Figure 2 approximately here.]
In the example of Figure 2, [µ
x
, µx] changes from [0.6, 0.9] to [0.55, 0.85]
afterx increased fromx′ tox′′. Since they intersect and forφ ∈ [µ˜−1(µx′′), µ˜−1(µx′)],
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µ˜(φ) is attainable before and after the policy change, this change in policy
has no effect on the equilibrium share of naive consumers when φ is in this
interval.
It is indeed surprising to see that a more stringent consumer protection
policy can be rendered completely ineffective by the actions of market par-
ticipants. Considering the often substantial costs in implementing and en-
forcing such policies, more caution is needed in making such policies. It is
important to note that a policy change can have different impacts in sym-
metric and asymmetric industries. If firms are rather symmetric, both firms
choose maximal obfuscation before and after the policy change and hence
the policy is effective.18 If, however, firms differ in their level of prominence
the policy effect can be very different and the policy may be ineffective.
3 Extensions and modifications
In this part, we discuss whether our model can be extended regarding five
aspects: alternative consumer protection policies, costs in obfuscation, price
above the reservation value, the number of firms and the possibility of ‘re-
verse obfuscation’.
3.1 Firm-Side Consumer Protection Policies
There are other policies that act directly on firms. For instance, to protect
consumers, a regulator may limit the length of the ‘footer’ section of a credit
card contract. One can model this type of policies through the highest pos-
sible obfuscation level under regulation, k¯. Let k¯′ and k¯′′ be the highest
possible obfuscation levels before and after an increase in firm-side policy,
respectively. That is, firm i chooses obfuscation ki from [k, k¯
′] before the
increase and from [k, k¯′′] after the increase, where k¯′′ < k¯′.
As in the consumer-side policy case, Firm 1 prefers as many naive con-
sumers as possible, and always chooses maximum obfuscation. Therefore,
for a given level of Firm 2’s obfuscation such a policy would be effective in
reducing overall obfuscation and hence, the share of naive consumers. Also,
as in the consumer-side policy case, however, when Firm 2’s most preferred
18In particular, if φ ∈
(
1
2
,
√
5−1
2
]
, Firm 2 chooses maximal obfuscation independent of the
level of consumer protection policy. In this case, policy is effective and reduces the share of
naive consumers.
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share of naive consumers µ˜(φ) is attainable by choosing an intermediate
level of obfuscation, Firm 2might obfuscate more in response to a strength-
ening of the firm-side policy.
For a given consumer-side protection policy x, let µ
k¯′ = (1 − x)θ(k¯′, k)
and µk¯′ = (1 − x)θ(k¯′, k¯′) be the lowest and the highest share of naive con-
sumers that Firm 2 can attain under k¯′. Likewise, let µ
k¯′′ = (1 − x)θ(k¯′′, k)
and µk¯′′ = (1−x)θ(k¯′′, k¯′′) be the lowest and the highest share of naive con-
sumers that Firm 2 can attain under k¯′′. Analogous to Proposition 4, we
have the following result for firm-side consumer protection policy.
Proposition 5. Let the consumer-side protection policy x ∈ (0, 1) be fixed.
Suppose an increase in firm-side consumer protection policy reduces k¯′ to
k¯′′.
1. Firm 1 obfuscates less.
2. If µk¯′′ ≥ µk¯′ and µk¯′′ > 12 , then there exists a φ such that µ˜(φ) ∈
[µ
k¯′ , µk¯′′ ]. Moreover, for all such φ, the equilibrium share of naive con-
sumers is not affected and Firm 2 obfuscates more.
3. The equilibrium share of naive consumers is reduced in the following
three cases.
(a) µk¯′′ < µk¯′ ;
(b) µk¯′′ ≥ µk¯′ but µk¯′′ ≤ 12 ;
(c) µk¯′′ ≥ µk¯′ and µk¯′′ > 12 , but µ˜(φ) /∈ [µk¯′ , µk¯′′ ].
The proof of Proposition 5, which is omitted here, follows closely that of
Proposition 4 after noting that µk¯′′ < µk¯′ and µk¯′′ < µk¯′ . The intuition also
carries over.
Similar to the consumer-side policy case, whether a firm-side policy is
effective or not in reducing the equilibrium share of naive consumers de-
pends largely on the extent it reduces the upper bound of the attainable
share of naive consumers, µk¯′′ . If µk¯′′ < max{µk¯′ , 12}, the policy is guaran-
teed to be effective.
Sometimes both consumer-side andfirm-side consumer protectionmea-
sures are available to policy-makers and the question arises which policy
should be implemented. In our model the effects of both policies are rather
19
similar (compare Proposition 4 and 5) and it is clear that the effectiveness
of policy measures rely heavily on the upper bound of the attainable share
of naive consumers. Our model suggests that typically both types of poli-
cies are effective or none is.19 Thus, whether a policy-maker should choose
consumer-side, firm-side or a mix to implement the most effective policy
measure depends largely on the functionµ(x, k1, k2) and the associated costs
of the two types of policies.
3.2 Costly Obfuscation
In this part we consider the implications of obfuscation costs. To isolate
the effect of prominence, we assume θ is symmetric. More specifically, we
assume that the values of the twice continuously differentiable function θ
and its first and second order derivatives remain the same at each permu-
tation of (k1, k2). For simplicity, we consider a strictly positive but not pro-
hibitively high constant marginal cost of obfuscation, c. To focus on non-
trivial cases, let ∂θ
∂ki
(k, k) be sufficiently large and ∂θ
∂ki
(k¯, k¯) = 0. In the bench-
mark zero cost case, the more prominent Firm 1 generally obfuscates more
than the less prominent Firm 2. We now show that this result still holds
when obfuscation is costly.
Proposition 6. Let θ : [k, k¯]2 → (0, 1) be symmetric and twice continuously
differentiable. Assume ∂θ
∂ki
> 0, ∂
2θ
∂k2
i
< 0 and ∂
2θ
∂k2
i
< ∂
2θ
∂k1∂k2
< − ∂2θ
∂k2
i
for
i = 1, 2. Then, Firm 1’s equilibrium obfuscation is always higher than that
of Firm 2.
Proof: see Appendix A(v).
Proposition 6 confirms that the pattern of strategic obfuscation remains
qualitatively unchanged when obfuscation is costly. The more prominent
firm obfuscates more as long as the cross derivative of θ is well behaved.
The intuition of the standard case also carries over: the more prominent
firm benefitsmore from the presence of naive consumers and it has stronger
19Suppose, for instance, if x is high, the interval [µ
x
, µ
x
] is rather low and Firm 2 is likely to
obfuscate fully. In that case, both policy measures (reducing k¯ and increasing x) are likely
to be very effective. To the contrary, suppose that x is a bit lower so that Firm 2 chooses
an intermediate level of obfuscation. In that case, neither policy measure can be (locally)
effective. In response to either intervention, Firm 2would react by obfuscatingmoremaking
both policy measures potentially ineffective.
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incentives to obfuscate.
We argue that an increase in consumer protection policy x in this case is
expected to decrease Firm 1’s obfuscation level. The reason is that under a
stricter protection policy, the same level of obfuscation confuses fewer con-
sumers and therefore the marginal benefit of obfuscation decreases. This
prompts Firm 1 to reduce costly obfuscation. See the first order condition
(20) in Appendix A(v).20 The prediction for Firm 2 is less clear cut because
it depends on how much the share of naive consumers has decreased as µ
appears in its first order condition (21). Depending on the functional form
of θ, Firm 2’s equilibrium obfuscationmay either decrease or increase. Thus
the impact of consumer protection policy is qualitatively similar to the stan-
dard case where obfuscation is costless.
3.3 Prices above the Reservation Value
So far, we have assumed that firms cannot choose prices above the reserva-
tion price r. But, in fact, firmsmight have incentive to raise the price above r
if confused consumers—besides being unable to compare different offers—
are also unable to evaluate whether the offer is worthwhile to buy at all. In
this section we consider the implications when firms may charge prices up
to r¯ > r.
Consumers payingprices higher than r receive a negative surplus. Hence,
sophisticated consumers will never buy at such prices, but rather abstain
from buying the product at all. Naive consumers, however, may buy at
such prices as they do not understand the true price. As a result, a firm
charging above r can only expect to sell to naive consumers. The following
proposition characterizes the pricing stage:
Lemma 3. Define µ1 =
r
r¯(1−φ)+rφ and µ2 =
r
r¯φ+r(1−φ) , where µ1 > µ2.
1. Suppose µ ≥ µ1. Then, there exists a pure strategy equilibriumwhere
both firms charge p1 = p2 = r¯. Profits are Π1 = φµr¯ and Π2 = (1 −
φ)µr¯.
2. Suppose µ1 > µ ≥ µ2. Then, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium
where firms charge p1 = r¯ and p2 = r. Profits are Π1 = φµr¯ and
20Given that the cross derivative is only of second order importance.
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Π2 = (1− φµ)r.
3. Suppose µ < µ2. Then, there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium in
which Firm 1 prices according to the cumulative distribution function
(17) F1(p) =


0 if p < p0
(1−φµ)[(φµ+1−µ)p−φµr¯]
(1−µ)(φµ+1−µ)p if p0 ≤ p < r
1 if p = r¯
and Firm 2 prices according to the cumulative distribution function
(18) F2(p) =


0 if p < p0
1− φµ1−µ
(
r¯
p
− 1
)
if p0 ≤ p < r
1 if p ≥ r,
where
(19) p0 :=
φµ
φµ+ 1− µr¯
is the lower boundof both firms’ prices. Firm1 earns profits ofE(Π1) =
φµr¯. Firm 2 earns profits of E(Π2) =
(1−φµ)φµr¯
φµ+1−µ .
Proof: see Appendix A(vi).
The equilibriumpricing strategy comes in three parts anddepends largely
on the number of naive consumers. For a large number of naive consumers
(µ ≥ µ1), there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium where both firms charge
the highest possible price, r¯. In this equilibrium, firms target only naive
consumers who receive a negative surplus as the price exceeds the valua-
tion of the product. Sophisticated consumers do not buy at this price. Note
that both firms benefit from the presence of naive consumers and, hence,
both firms’ profits are increasing in µ.
For an intermediate number of naive consumers (µ1 > µ ≥ µ2), there ex-
ists a pure-strategy equilibrium with p1 = r¯ and p2 = r. As Firm 1 charges
above the reservation value, it targets naive consumers only. Firm 2 sells to
both consumer groups, to its share of naive consumers and to all sophisti-
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cated consumers. In this equilibrium, total consumer surplus is negative as
all those consumers buying fromFirm 1 obtain strictly negative utilitywhile
consumers buying from Firm 2 receive zero surplus. Firms have conflicting
views on the number of naive consumers. Firm 1’s (2’s) profits are strictly
increasing (decreasing) with µ.
Finally, for a small number of naive consumers (µ < µ2), there exists
an equilibrium in mixed strategies. This equilibrium resembles the mixed-
strategy equilibrium from the base model and has similar properties. Both
firms randomize about prices, and Firm 1 charges on average a higher price
than Firm 2. Note, however, that the price distributions of both firms have
mass points. Firm 1 has a mass point at r¯ and Firm 2 at r. Firm 1 profits
are increasing in the share of naive consumers. Firm 2 profits are hump-
shaped and may—as in the base model—increase or decrease in the share
of naive consumers. The maximum is attained at the same level µ˜ as in the
base model.
Regarding obfuscation decisions in stage 1, for all pricing regimes, Firm
1’s profits are strictly increasing in the number of naive consumers. Hence,
Firm 1 chooses maximal obfuscation, k∗1 = k¯. Firm 2’s profits are non-
monotonic, however, so the obfuscation choice is more involved. Figure 3
plots an example. As is evident from the figure, depending on [µ
x
, µx], Firm
2 may choose maximum, minimum or an intermediate level of obfuscation.
For instance, if µ˜ ∈ [µ
x
, µx], intermediate obfuscation would result with k
∗
2
chosen such that µ∗ = µ˜.
[Place Figure 3 approximately here.]
We now study the impact of protection policies. Depending on parame-
ters we would have to consider and differentiate many cases. Hence, in the
following we will focus our discussion on some key cases. We will show
that, as in the base model, the introduction of a consumer protection pol-
icy may not be effective. We will also show that in the most harmful cases,
where obfuscationmight lead to negative consumer surplus, consumer pro-
tection policies are effective.
Proposition 7. Suppose consumer protection policy strictly increases from x′
to x′′.
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1. If µ˜ ∈ [µ
x′ , µx′ ] and µ˜ ∈ [µx′′ , µx′′ ], then the equilibrium share of naive
consumers is unaffected and Firm 2 obfuscates more.
2. If µ∗ > µ2 results under policy x′, then the equilibrium share of naive
consumers is reduced following the introduction of policy x′′.
The first part shows that, as in the base model, a consumer protection
policy might not be effective as it might increase the obfuscation incentives
by Firm 2. The intuition from the base model carries over.
Like in the base model before, the second part of the proposition shows
that in the most harmful cases, namely where obfuscation leads to nega-
tive consumer surplus, consumer protection is effective. In these cases, the
number of naive consumers is reduced in response to the policy. The reason
is that under x′ Firm 2 chooses either minimum or maximum obfuscation,
but not an intermediate level of obfuscation (see Figure 3). Both the mini-
mum as well as the maximum level of naive consumers that are attainable
under x′′ are reduced. Hence, the policy x′′ reduces the equilibrium share
of naive consumers.
3.4 Number of Firms
We now check the validity of our main result in oligopolies instead of a
duopoly. Suppose there are N > 2 firms in the market that differ in their
prominence and let φi be the share of naive consumers Firm i = 1, 2, . . . , N
receives. Without loss of generality, assume φi > φi+1 for all i. Drawing
from Kocas and Kiyak (2006), we know that for a given share of naive con-
sumers µ ∈ (0, 1), Firms 1 toN−2 charge the reservation price rwhile Firms
N − 1 and N will compete for the sophisticated consumers in the pricing
equilibrium. In other words, only the two least prominent firms employ
mixed strategy pricing. Accordingly, all firms except for Firm N earn the
same expected profits as theywould earn by selling only to their own shares
of naive consumers. That is, E(Πi) = φiµr, i = 1, 2, . . . , N −1. For the same
reasons explained before, Firm N earns higher expected profits than sell-
ing only to its own share of naive consumers, E(ΠN ) =
φN−1 µr[φN µ+1−µ]
φN−1 µ+1−µ >
φN µr.
21
21The derivations are available from the authors but omitted here for brevity.
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In the obfuscation stage, all firms except for Firm N prefer maximal ob-
fuscation while Firm N , like Firm 2 in the standard case, has its ideal level
of naive consumers, µ˜. Hence, a result that resembles Proposition 1 can be
established where Firms 1 to N − 1 obfuscate fully and Firm N ’s choice of
obfuscation depends on the comparison between µ˜ and the attainable range
of µ for Firm N . As a result, if µ˜ is attainable before and after a strength-
ening in consumer protection policy, Firm N will obfuscate more and the
policywill be rendered ineffective. In this sense, ourmain result holds qual-
itatively in a general oligopoly.
3.5 Counter Obfuscation
Although in our model firms are allowed only to obfuscate, practices in the
opposite direction can easily be taken into account. This is because instead
of ‘no obfuscation’, k can also be interpreted as, for example, offering a ver-
ifiable price comparison which arguably reduces the share of naive con-
sumers. As it is clear that only Firm 2 may prefer a lower k in equilibrium,
this extension just amounts to allowing for a lower µ
x
. Consequently, ceteris
paribus, Case (2b) in Proposition 1 becomes more likely while Case (2c) less
likely.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied obfuscation incentives by firms. Compet-
ing firms are heterogeneous in their level of prominence. While prominent
firms always choose to obfuscate, the incentives to obfuscate for less promi-
nent firms are more differentiated. We have identified several factors that
determine the optimal level of obfuscation. A lower level of asymmetry
in prominence and a stricter consumer protection policy increase the less
prominent firms’ incentives to obfuscate.
The key aim of the paper is to study the impact of regulation. We have
shown that consumer protection policies designed to reduce the scope of
obfuscation can have unintended consequence in asymmetric industries.
While the effect on prominent firms is as expected, there is an unintended,
adverse effect on less prominent firms. We have shown that these firms
may actually react by increasing their obfuscation levels due to such a pol-
icy. In the working paper version of our paper, Gu and Wenzel (2012), we
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provide experimental evidence which suggests that consumer protection
policies are indeed less effective than expected. However, more empirical
evidence is needed here. An interesting avenue for future research would
be to test this prediction using field data, possiblymaking use of the various
policy reforms in financial markets that have occurred in recent years.
Our analysis yields several implications for policy decisionmaking. First,
we show that more prominent firms are more likely to obfuscate than less
prominent ones. Consequently policy makers, aiming at promoting market
transparency, should design policies that target those firms. This is partic-
ularly effective in markets where asymmetry is large. Second, policy mak-
ers should be aware that consumer protection policies that promote trans-
parency may backfire in the sense that it may increase the incentives of less
prominent firms to engage in obfuscation strategies. We show that under
certain circumstances this may leave the level of transparency in the market
unchanged and thus make the policy redundant.
A Appendix
A.1 Comparative statics of price equilibrium
We show that expected prices charged by both firms increase in µ. This
can be demonstrated by showing that the equilibriumdistribution functions
decrease in µ.
1. dF2
dµ
= − φ(r−p)
(1−µ)2p . This is negative for all p < r and equal to zero for
p = r. Hence, the expected price charged by Firm 2 increases with µ.
2. dF1
dµ
= p(1−φ)(φµ+1−µ)
2+φr(2φµ−1−3φµ2+µ2−φ2µ2)
(1−µ)2(φµ+1−µ)2p . To show that
dF2
dµ
< 0,
it suffices to show that the numerator is negative. Define h = p(1 −
φ)(φµ + 1 − µ)2 + φr(2φµ − 1 − 3φµ2 + µ2 − φ2µ2). Note that dh
dp
=
(1 − φ)(φµ + 1 − µ)2 > 0 and h(p = r) = −r(1 − µ)2(2φ − 1) < 0.
Hence, h < 0 for all p ≤ r. Therefore, dF2
dµ
< 0.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: We only show Firm 2’s optimal obfuscation. Firm 2wants to increase
or decrease its own obfuscation level if
∂E(Π2)
∂k2
≷ 0⇔ φ(1− φ)µ2 − 2φµ+ 1 ≷ 0.
Let ω(µ) := φ(1 − φ)µ2 − 2φµ + 1. ω(µ) is a parabola that opens upward
with two roots being
φ±
√
φ(2φ−1)
φ(1−φ) . Since the larger root is above 1, µ˜(φ) is
the root of interest.
We note that µ(x, k1, k2) strictly increases in k2. We further differentiate
three cases. First, if µx < µ˜(φ), ω(µ) > 0 for all µ ∈ [µx, µx) and therefore,
Firm 2wants to increase its obfuscation level to the upper bound, k¯. Second,
if µ
x
> µ˜(φ), ω(µ) < 0 for all µ ∈ [µ
x
, µx] as µx < 1 <
φ+
√
φ(2φ−1)
φ(1−φ) . Conse-
quently, Firm 2 wants to reduce its obfuscation level to the lower bound, k.
Finally, when µ
x
< µ˜(φ) < µx, ω(µ) > 0 for all µ ∈ [µx, µ˜(φ)) and ω(µ) < 0
for all µ ∈ (µ˜(φ), µx]. The best choice for Firm 2 is then the unique level of
obfuscation such that µ(x, k1, k2) = µ˜(φ) = (1 − x)θ(k¯, k2). The boundary
cases are easily checked. Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: Following Propositions 1 and 2, we only have to show Part 2.
If µ
x
< µ˜(φ) < µx, µ
∗ = µ˜(φ) and consequently, µ∗ strictly decreases in
φ. See Equation (16).
From Proposition 1, we know in this case (1− x)θ(k¯, k∗2) = µ˜(φ). Differ-
entiating both sides w.r.t. φ we have
(1− x) ∂θ
∂k2
dk∗2
dφ
=
dµ˜(φ)
dφ
< 0.
Hence, whenever µ∗ = µ˜(φ), dk
∗
2
dφ
< 0, that is, Firm 2’s equilibrium obfusca-
tion strictly decreases in φ.
Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof: Since x′′ > x′, we note that µx′′ < µx′ and µx′′ < µx′ .
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1. Supposeµx′′ ≥ µx′ andµx′′ > 12 . Since µ˜(φ) is a continuous and strictly
decreasing function with domain
(
1
2 , 1
)
and range
(
1
2 , 2
)
, there exists
a φ such that µ˜(φ) ∈ [µ
x′ , µx′′ ]. This means that for all such φ, µ˜(φ)
is attainable before and after the policy change. By Proposition 2, µ∗
remains the same. As (1−x′)θ(k¯, k∗′2 ) = (1−x′′)θ(k¯, k∗
′′
2 ) , x
′′ > x′ and
∂θ
∂k2
> 0, k∗
′′
2 > k
∗′
2 . Therefore, in this case Firm 2 obfuscates more.
2. We now consider the following three cases. In each case, we show
that the equilibrium share of naive consumers is lower under x′′ than
under x′.
(a) If µx′′ < µx′ , [µx′′ , µx′′ ] and [µx′ , µx′ ] do not intersect. The equi-
librium share of naive consumers is trivially reduced.
(b) Suppose µx′′ ≥ µx′ but µx′′ ≤ 12 . In this case µx′′ ≤ 12 < µ˜(φ)
for all φ ∈ (12 , 1). By Proposition 1, the equilibrium share of
naive consumers after the policy change is µx′′ which is strictly
less than either µx′ (if µx′ ≤ 12 ) or any previously attainable µ˜(φ)
(if µx′ >
1
2 > µx′).
(c) Suppose µx′′ ≥ µx′ and µx′′ > 12 but µ˜(φ) /∈ [µx′ , µx′′ ]. By Propo-
sition 1, for those φ such that µ˜(φ) > µx′′ , the equilibrium share
of naive consumers under x′ is either µx′ or µ˜(φ). Both are larger
than the equilibrium share of naive consumers under x′′, µx′′ .
When there exist a φ such that µ˜(φ) < µ
x′ , the equilibrium share
of naive consumers under x′ is µ
x′ . For all such φ, the equilib-
rium share of naive consumers is reduced under x′′ because it is
either µ˜(φ) or µ
x′′ .
Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof: We differentiate two cases. First, as in the zero cost case, when
φ(1− φ)µ2 − 2φµ+ 1 ≤ 0,
∂E(Π2)
∂k2
≤ 0 and hence, Firm 2 chooses not to obfuscate. Second, when φ(1−
φ)µ2 − 2φµ + 1 > 0 we have an interior solution as ∂θ
∂ki
(k, k) is assumed to
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be sufficiently large and θ is twice continuously differentiable. We show in
both cases, Firm 1 obfuscates more in equilibrium.
The first case is trivial. Suppose φ(1 − φ)µ2 − 2φµ + 1 ≤ 0 and hence
k∗2 = k. Since
∂θ
∂k1
(k, k) is sufficiently large, c < φr(1 − x) ∂θ
∂k1
(k, k), and this
means k∗1 > k = k
∗
2 .
We now consider equilibria in which k∗i > k for i = 1, 2. At such an
interior solution the first order conditions are met. Using (13) and (14) and
taking into account the constant marginal cost of obfuscation, we have
∂E(Π1)
∂k1
− c = φr(1− x) ∂θ
∂k1
(k∗1, k
∗
2)− c = 0(20)
∂E(Π2)
∂k2
− c = [φ(1− φ)µ
2 − 2φµ+ 1]φr(1− x)
[φµ+ (1− µ)]2
∂θ
∂k2
(k∗1, k
∗
2)− c = 0.(21)
From (20) and (21) we know
∂θ
∂k1
(k∗1, k
∗
2) =
[φ(1− φ)µ2 − 2φµ+ 1]
[φµ+ (1− µ)]2
∂θ
∂k2
(k∗1, k
∗
2).
Observe that
φ(1− φ)µ2 − 2φµ+ 1 < [φµ+ (1− µ)]2
⇔2φ2µ− 3φµ+ 4φ+ µ− 2 > 0
⇔(2φ− 1)[2− (1− φ)µ] > 0.
As φ ∈ (12 , 1) and µ ∈ (0, 1), we can conclude that
(22)
∂θ
∂k1
(k∗1, k
∗
2) <
∂θ
∂k2
(k∗1, k
∗
2).
Our last step is to show that (22) implies k∗1 > k
∗
2 . By applying symmetry
(twice) and Clairaut’s theorem as θ is twice continuously differentiable, we
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have
∂θ
∂k1
(k∗1, k
∗
2)−
∂θ
∂k2
(k∗1, k
∗
2) < 0⇔
∂θ
∂k2
(k∗2, k
∗
1)−
∂θ
∂k2
(k∗1, k
∗
2) < 0
⇔ ∂θ
∂k2
(k∗1, k
∗
1)−
∫ k∗
1
k∗
2
∂θ2
∂k2∂k1
(k, k∗1)dk −
∂θ
∂k2
(k∗1, k
∗
1) +
∫ k∗
1
k∗
2
∂θ2
∂k22
(k∗1, k)dk < 0
⇔
∫ k∗
1
k∗
2
[
∂θ2
∂k22
(k∗1, k)−
∂θ2
∂k2∂k1
(k, k∗1)
]
dk < 0
⇔
∫ k∗
1
k∗
2
[
∂θ2
∂k21
(k, k∗1)−
∂θ2
∂k1∂k2
(k, k∗1)
]
dk < 0.
(23)
Since ∂
2θ
∂k2
i
< ∂
2θ
∂k1∂k2
, (23) implies k∗1 > k
∗
2 . Q.E.D.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: Define µ1 =
r
r¯(1−φ)+rφ and µ2 =
r
r¯φ+r(1−φ) , where µ1 > µ2.
1. Suppose that µ ≥ µ1. We show that both firms charging r¯ is an equi-
librium. At this price firms only sell to naive consumers and earn
profits of Π1 = φµr¯ and Π2 = (1 − φ)µr¯. Note that charging a price
pi ∈ (r, r¯) is never optimal as at such prices only naive consumers buy
and for a firm targeting naive consumers only charging r¯ is profit-
maximising. A firm considering to deviate and sell also to sophisti-
cated consumers has to reduce its price to r. This is not profitable for
Firm 2 if (1 − φ)µr¯ ≥ [(1 − φ)µ + (1 − µ)]r ⇔ µ ≥ r
r¯(1−φ)+rφ = µ1.
Such a deviation is not profitable for Firm 1 φµr¯ ≥ [φµ+ (1− µ)]r ⇔
µ ≥ r
r¯φ+r(1−φ) = µ2. As µ ≥ µ1, no firm has incentive to deviate from
p1 = p2 = r¯.
2. Suppose µ1 > µ ≥ µ2. We show that p1 = r¯ and p2 = r is an equi-
librium. Firm 1 sells to naive consumers only and Firm 2 sells to its
share of naive consumers and to all sophisticated consumers. Firm 1
may consider to compete also for sophisticated consumers for which
it needs to undercut the price by Firm 2. This is not profitable as
φµr¯ ≥ [φµ + (1 − µ)]r ⇔ µ ≥ r
r¯φ+r(1−φ) = µ2. Given that Firm 1
charges r¯ it is optimal to charge sophisticated consumers the high-
est possible price, r. Selling only to naive consumers does not lead to
higher profits as (1−φ)µr¯ < [(1−φ)µ+(1−µ)]r ⇔ µ < r
r¯(1−φ)+rφ = µ1.
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3. Suppose µ < µ2. Then, both firms want to compete for sophisticated
consumers and a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. The exis-
tence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium can be shown along the lines
of Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1988), with two differences. First,
both firms equilibrium price distributions have mass points; Firm 1’s
equilibrium distribution has amass point on r¯ and Firms 2’s on r. Sec-
ond, in equilibrium, there is no density mass on prices in the interval
(r, r¯).
We start by deriving equilibrium profits. Firm 1 can always guarantee
profits ofE(Π1) = φµr¯ by selling to naive consumers only. Firm 1will
also never set a lower price than p0 =
φµ
φµ+(1−µ) r¯ as this would lead to
lower profits even if selling to all sophisticated consumers. Hence,
Firm 2 profits can be calculated as E(Π2) = [(1 − φ)µ + (1 − µ)]p0 =
(1−φµ)φµr¯
φµ+(1−µ) .
Next, we derive the equilibrium distribution functions. In equilib-
rium, firms randomize over prices in the interval [p0, r] and there may
be mass points at r and r¯. Note that firms do no put positive density
on prices in the interval (r, r¯) as those prices are strictly dominated
by choosing r¯ instead. This is because at prices higher than r only
naive consumer buy and those consumers buy in fixed proportions
φ : (1− φ) from the two firms and, hence, do not react to price differ-
ences between firms.
Using the fact that in a mixed strategy equilibrium, every price in the
domain of the mixed-strategy equilibrium must yield identical prof-
its we can now solve for the equilibrium distribution functions. The
equilibrium probability distribution function by Firm 2 is implicitly
given by
φµr¯ = p[φµ+ (1− µ)(1− F2)],
which yields
(24) F2 = 1− φµ
1− µ
(
r¯
p
− 1
)
.
Similarly, the equilibrium distribution function by Firm 1 is implicitly
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given by
(1− φµ)φµr¯
φµ+ (1− µ) = p[(1− φ)µ+ (1− µ)(1− F1)],
which gives
(25) F1 =
(1− φµ)[(φµ+ 1− µ)p− φµr¯]
(1− µ)[φµ+ (1− µ)]p .
Note that F1(p = p0) = F2(p = p0) = 0. Hence, both firms do not put
density on prices below p0. Note also that Firm 1’s equilibrium strat-
egy has amass point on r¯. The size of themass point is 1−F1(p = r) >
0. Firm 2 has a mass point on r with size 1−F2(p = r) = φµ(
r¯
r
−1)
1−µ > 0.
Finally, we note that Firm 2 has no incentive to put positive density on
r¯ as this would yield lower profits: E(Π2) =
(1−φµ)φµr¯
φµ+(1−µ) > (1− φ)µr¯ ⇔
(2φ−1)(1−µ)µr¯
φµ+(1−µ) > 0.
Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium share of naive consumers as a function of asymmetry
with µ
x
= 0.6 and µx = 0.9
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Figure 2: Equilibrium shares of naive consumers before (x′) and after (x′′)
an increase in consumer protection strength: for φ ∈ [µ˜−1(µx′′), µ˜−1(µx′)],
µ∗ remains the same
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Figure 3: Firm 2 profits depending on the share of naive consumers (µ)
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